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Terrorism, Tips, and the Touchstone of
Reasonableness: Seeking a Balance
Between Threat Response and Privacy

Dilution
Geoffrey S. Com*
Abstract
It is the morning of the Oklahoma City terrorist bombing. The
phone rings in the Oklahoma City Police Department, and a duty officer
answers. The caller says, "There's a Ryder rental truck parked in front
of the Murrah Federal Building with a massive bomb inside set to go off
within one hour." The caller then hangs up. The duty officer alerts all
nearby patrol units, and within three minutes an officer confirms the
presence of the Ryder truck. What should the police do next? What
response would be reasonable? Does the law permit them to cordon the
area, take control of the vehicle, and use bomb detection technology to
penetrate into the truck in order to confirm or deny the tip? If so, what
limits, if any, apply to the use of contraband they may find inside the
truck as evidence in a subsequent trial?
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Security experts continue to remind Americans that the threat of

terrorist attacks inflicting mass casualties on the homeland is not a
question of if, but of when. 1 This, coupled with the increasing
prevalence of the homegrown lone-wolf terrorist-the radicalized
terrorist operative within our midst who decides to act on his own to
achieve maximum harmful effect-is increasingly viewed as a
significant contemporary terrorist threat.2 For these potential terrorists,

conventional high explosive devices concealed in automobiles are the
logical means to achieve their mass casualty objectives. This is
unsurprising; attacks such as the Oklahoma City bombing and failed
attempts in Times Square and Portland all indicate the effectiveness and
relative ease of employment of such weapons.3 These incidents illustrate
the ideal nature of vehicles to deploy, conceal, and ultimately execute
mass casualty attacks.4 Indeed, the car bomb has become a weapon of
choice around the globe for terrorists who seek to inflict mass casualties
with minimal resources, especially in densely populated areas. 5 The ease
of construction and employment, and the difficulty of detection once the

1. See generally JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41416,
AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT (2011), available at
http://bit.ly/bfRVU6.
2. See Jessica Stem, The ProteanEnemy, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 27, 33-34 (2003).

3. See generally Al Baker & William K. Rashbaum, Police Find Car Bomb in
Times Square, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at Al, available at http://nyti.ms/aZdOkA;
David Johnston, At Least 31 Are Dead,Scores Are Missing After Car Bomb Attack in
Oklahoma City Wrecks 9-Story Federal Office Building, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at
Al; Oregon Bomb-Plot Suspect Wanted 'Spectacular Show,' USA TODAY (Nov. 28,
2010), http://usat.ly/e3t0qn.

4.

See generally Robert Baer, Why the Car Bomb Is a Terrorist's Best Weapon,

TIME (Sept. 22, 2008), http://ti.me/5MZOGW.
5. See Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs)

[Car Bombs], GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://bit.ly/166eFNF (last visited Aug. 24, 2013) [hereinafter VBIEDs].
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vehicle is mixed within normal dense traffic, 6 indicates why this is
logical.
In areas of ongoing combat operations or post-conflict stability
operations, military and civilian security personnel utilize extensive
random vehicle inspections to detect and deter the car bomb threat.7 It is,
however, unrealistic to expect this counter-terror tactic to be extended to
the domestic U.S. context. It is true that established Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence does permit random checkpoint searches to deter the threat
of terrorist attacks. 8 However, widespread domestic use of such random
checkpoints to a degree even closely resembling use in conflict zones is
almost inconceivable. 9 Furthermore, in practice these counter-terrorism
checkpoints are normally utilized only in response to some credible
report of imminent terrorist attacks, which raises another concern: does
an anonymous tip qualify as a credible threat indicator? And if so, once
police have established individualized suspicion derived from an
anonymous tip, and therefore know exactly where to look or whom to
look for, is the use of the checkpoint search reasonable? The answer to
these questions is unclear. From a practical perspective, the efficacy of
this permissible deterrent tactic in response to a lone-wolf threat is also
unclear due to the extremely unpredictable nature of the threat.' 0
As in other criminal investigations, terrorism investigations-in
particular the investigatory response to the threat of the lone-wolf
terrorist-will frequently necessitate heavy reliance on tips from
confidential or anonymous informants.
Unlike other criminal
investigations, however, the nature of the threat presents a risk to the
public of an exceedingly high order of magnitude. One need only
consider the level of destruction that would have resulted had the Times
Square or Portland bombing attempts been consummated. Terrorism
investigations thus present a unique dilemma for law enforcement. Like
other law enforcement investigations, the use of tips to focus police
efforts is highly probable. However, unlike other types of investigations,
police will rarely have the luxury of conducting thorough investigations
to corroborate the tip sufficiently to establish either probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to justify a seizure or search of a suspected car
bomb. We must therefore anticipate that in the future, law enforcement

6.

Id.

7. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-19.4: MILITARY POLICE
LEADERS' HANDBOOK 684-87 (2002).
8. See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
9. See Rachel R. Watson, When Individual Liberty and Police Procedure Collide:
The Unconstitutionality of High-Crime Area Checkpoints, 24 U. DAYTON L. REv. 95,
109-11 (1998).
10. See United States v. Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1995).
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agents will become aware of car bomb threats from informant tips that
fail to generate the type of additional information needed to render an
immediate responsive seizure or search of the vehicle reasonable within
the meaning of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As a result,
the nature of this emerging and genuinely frightening threat, combined
with the existing standards defining the reasonableness of searches and
seizures, creates a troubling disconnect.
Accordingly, I propose that it is necessary to adjust both the type of
information required to establish reasonable suspicion and the scope of
the accordant protective search in response to a tip of an imminent
terrorist attack endangering the public. This adjustment would allow a
finding of reasonable suspicion based on police confirmation of existing
and openly available details provided by a car bomb tip. A protective
search based on the Terry doctrine would be permitted to extend to any
part of the car capable of concealing an explosive device, including the
trunk and other concealed interior areas. These adjustments would allow
an effective law enforcement response to such a tip and ameliorate the
current disconnect between the logical response to a car bomb tip and the
existing standards for assessing the reasonableness of a search or
seizure-a disconnect exacerbated by terrorists' proclivity to use the car
bomb as a weapon of choice to produce mass casualties."'
Expanding the authority to search or seize an automobile, however,
will also increase the risk of police abuse of individual liberty.
Therefore, I also propose that any such expansion of terrorist threat
response authority should be offset by a limitation on the admissibility of
evidence seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine. 12 When such
evidence is the result of a protective automobile search or seizure
conducted in response to an anonymous car bomb tip, failure to validate
the terrorist threat as the result of the search (by finding terrorist-related
evidence) would trigger a presumption of inadmissibility for any
evidence unrelated to the alleged terrorist threat. Admissibility of such
evidence would then require that the prosecution establish by clear and
13
convincing evidence that the protective search was in fact legitimate.
This limitation would strike a reasonable balance between the need to
search vehicles on a lower quantum of proof in response to nonpredictive tips of terrorist activity with the protection of the individual
from the consequence of searches that prove to be based on faulty or
fabricated information. 14 It will also protect society from subterfuge

11.
12.
13.
14.

See generally Baer, supra note 4.
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,465-73 (1971).
See id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29(1968).
See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000); Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
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searches because police will know that deliberate misuse of this terrorist
tip exception will produce no evidentiary benefit.15
Part II of this Article will provide an overview of existing standards
for assessing the reasonableness of searches or seizures; address dangers
associated with the combination of homegrown terrorism and car bombs;
and explain how existing tests for reasonableness fail to sufficiently
address this threat. Part III will propose a modification of the test for
establishing reasonable suspicion and the permissible scope of a
reasonable suspicion-based response to a car bomb threat. Part IV will
then propose a counterbalance to this expanded search authority: a
limited evidentiary use rule derived from the. military inspection context.
This Article will conclude in Part V.
II.

AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES, EXISTING STANDARDS OF
REASONABLENESS, AND RISK PREVENTION: AN INHERENT

DISCONNECT
Existing automobile search authority provides the logical starting
point for analyzing this dilemma and considering an appropriate
response. 16 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures,17 and it is an axiom of Fourth Amendment analysis that "[t]he18
is reasonableness.,
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness is presumed where police have probable cause that an
automobile contains contraband and obtain a warrant to search the
automobile. 19 Such a presumption is difficult to challenge. 20 However,
21
most automobile searches occur without a warrant. 2 1 In such situations,
the burden is on the government to assert an established exception to the
warrant requirement and thereby rebut the presumptive unreasonableness
of the warrantless search.2 2
This burden is often easily satisfied.
Well-settled Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence permits warrantless searches of automobiles
as reasonable pursuant to both the automobile and/or exigent

15.

SeeJ.L.,529U.S. at274.

16.

See Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690, 693-97 (E.D. Va. 1974), rev'd

on other grounds, 528 F.2d 1142 (4th Cir. 1975).

17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated....").
18. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).
19. See United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1261 (1 lth Cir. 2006).
20. See id. at 1261-62.
21. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999).
22. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) ("[T]he [automobile]
exception to the warrant requirement ... applies only to searches of vehicles that are
supported by probable cause.").
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circumstances exceptions.23 However, both of these exceptions apply
only to the warrant requirement and presuppose that the search is
conducted pursuant to valid probable cause. Therefore, neither exception
alters the conclusion that a full search of a car based on a tip that does
not provide probable cause would be unreasonable.2 4 Accordingly, the
existence of valid probable cause remains the touchstone to determine
whether a full evidentiary search of the vehicle is reasonable.
A.

WarrantExceptions: Close, but not Close Enough

Since the Supreme Court decided Carrollv. United States2 6 in 1925,
automobiles have been exempt from the normal warrant requirement.
The Carroll exception provides that where police have probable cause
that contraband or evidence is in an automobile (or in a container inside
an automobile), a search for that item is reasonable without a warrant.27
Accordingly, if police observation of an automobile establishes probable
cause that the automobile contains a car bomb, immediate action to
search the automobile for the car bomb (or to seize the automobile to
remove it from the scene) would be reasonable, and any contraband or
evidence that comes into plain view during that search would be
admissible for later use at trial. It would matter not whether the police
observation resulting in probable cause occurred in response to an
anonymous tip28-such as the discovery of the car bomb by the New
York Police Department on New Year's Eve 2010 in response to a tip
from a street vendor 9-- or was merely random. So long as the
information resulting in probable cause was not obtained as the result of
an unreasonable search or seizure, a full search of the automobile is
reasonable.3 °
Exigent circumstances would also permit a full search of the
automobile based on probable cause that it had been weaponized,
although the automobile exception to the warrant requirement renders
23. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
24. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (discussing how an officer
conducting an otherwise lawful search of an automobile "clearly cannot be required to
ignore [other] contraband" because "the Fourth Amendment does not require its
suppression in such circumstances").
25. See id. at 1049-50 (reasoning that the protection of self and others authorizes
police officers to conduct investigatory searches).
26. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
27. See id at 156-57 ("In cases where seizure is impossible except without warrant,
the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable
cause.").
28. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990).
29. See generally Baker & Rashbaum, supra note 3.
30. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245-46 (1983).
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this exception functionally superfluous. 3'
Because the exigent
circumstances exception is based in part on an underlying safety
rationale, it is tempting to conclude that it should justify a search in
response to the anonymous tip that forms the hypothetical context for
this discussion.3 2 However, exigent circumstances arise in response to
situations that by their very nature create probable cause.33 Thus, like the
automobile exception, the exigent circumstances exception presupposes
the existence of probable cause-the cause that itself triggers the
exigency justifies dispensing with the warrant requirement. 34 Indeed, as
the Court has noted, this exception is in effect an efficiency compromise:
when police confront an exigency, it would be inefficient and potentially
dangerous to require them to obtain a warrant prior to responding to the
exigency.35
Accordingly, as an exception only to the warrant
requirement, exigent circumstances will not justify a search based on
anything less than probable cause.36

Accordingly, because both the automobile exception and the
exigency exception apply only to the warrant requirement, probable
cause remains a necessary predicate for the reasonable search of an
automobile and seizure of contraband or evidence discovered therein.37
Whether verification of the description and location of a vehicle provided
by an anonymous tip would establish probable cause is therefore a
critical question. If the answer is yes, a fully intrusive response is
reasonable, and any evidence uncovered during the search of the vehicle,
even if unrelated to the terrorist tip and investigation, would be
admissible pursuant to the plain view doctrine.38 If the answer is no, the
full-blown search of the vehicle would be unreasonable, and evidence
uncovered would be inadmissible as the fruit of that unreasonable search.
However, the issue of seizure is slightly more complicated and will be
addressed below.
31. See Minceyv. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978).
32. See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
33. See Jeff Fisher, Lowering Standards: The Simultaneous-School-Bombing-andShooting-Threat Exception of Armijo Ex Rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 41 N.M. L.
REv. 69, 85-86 (2011).
34. See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 300-10; see, e.g., J. Keith Killian, Warrantless
Automobile Searches and Seizure: The Chambers Immobilization Doctrine and Its
Abandonment in Colorado, 50 U. COLO. L. REv. 75, 77-79 (1978).
35. See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 309-10; Gerald G. Ashdown, Good Faith, the
Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-OrientedAdjudication in the CriminalProcess, 24 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 335, 354-55 (1983).
36. See Adam Kennedy Peck, The Securing of the Premises Exception: A Search for
the ProperBalance, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1589, 1618-19 (1985).
37. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991).
38. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 (1990) ("[T]he seizure of an object
in plain view does not involve an intrusion on privacy.").
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Existing probable cause jurisprudence almost conclusively indicates
that verifying open and non-predictive information such as the location
and characteristics of the vehicle referenced in the tip is insufficient to
The seminal decision Illinois v. Gates39
establish probable cause.
provides the longstanding and controlling framework for assessing when
an informant's tip creates probable cause.4 ° While the Supreme Court in
Gates rejected a rigid analytical framework and adopted a totality of the
circumstances approach, it nonetheless indicated the continuing
relevance of assessing tips through a two-prong lens: (1) the veracity of
the informant; and (2) the foundation for the tip. 4' The veracity prong
focuses on whether there is some way to establish that the tipster's
information is trustworthy-in effect some substitute for oath or
affirmation; 42 the foundation prong focuses on how the tipster came to
know of the criminal conduct identified in the tip. 43 The totality of the
circumstances test indicates that probable cause may exist in situations in
which the strength of one of these prongs is slight, so long as the strength
of the other prong offsets this deficiency.44 For example, in Gates, the
Court concluded that it was virtually impossible to know anything about
the veracity of an anonymous informant, as opposed to a confidential
informant with a track record. 45 As a result, police corroboration of the
tip's detailed predictions about the defendants' future conduct, which the
Court concluded would only be known to someone with intimate
knowledge of the defendants' activities, provided a solid foundation
rendering the overall reliability of the tip sufficient to establish probable
46
cause.

Accordingly, Gates provides several important guideposts for
assessing the sufficiency of a tip when determining whether probable
cause exists. For one, anonymous tips, because they provide virtually no
indicia of veracity, must be based on a solid foundation of knowledge to
39. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
40. Id. at 244-45 ("It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that
corroboration through other sources of information reduced the chances of a reckless or
prevaricating tale, thus providing a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
41. See id. at 241-45.
42. See id. at 243-44.
43. See id. at 241-42.
44. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 ("The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make
a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.").
45. Id. at 237.
46. Id. at 245 ("If the informant had access to accurate information of this
[predictive] type a magistrate could properly conclude that it was not unlikely that he also
had access to reliable information of the . . . alleged illegal activities.").
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compensate for this deficiency.4 7 In addition, when assessing the quality
of this foundation, there are two key considerations. First, is the tip
predictive in nature? Second, do the predictions suggest the informant's
knowledge is the result of an intimate connection with or inside access to
the activities of the target? If subsequent police investigation indicates
that the answer to these questions is yes-investigation that corroborates
that the tipster is providing predictive insider information-then the
anonymity of the tip is sufficiently offset and probable cause is
established.48 In a situation involving an anonymous tip of terrorist
activity, it would be extremely unlikely that police investigation could
validate such a solid foundation for the tip (which may not be based on
the ultimate discovery of a bomb in the car precisely because this is the
suspicion that must be validated prior to a search that results in this
discovery). When police corroboration is impracticable or impossiblethe situation that would arise as the result of an anonymous tip of a
terrorist car bomb-what alternate options might apply?
This probable cause requirement is triggered only when gathering
evidence is the primary purpose of the investigatory response.
Responding to such a tip, however, implicates an interest quite distinct
from simply gathering evidence for the purpose of building a case: that
of protecting the police and the public from imminent harm. Because of
this reality, probable cause is not the exclusive test of reasonableness
pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. 49 This situation implicates two
alternative theories of reasonableness. The first is the special needs
doctrine,50 which allows police to conduct carefully limited searches or
seizures without warrant or even reasonable suspicion when the primary
purpose of the intrusion is protection of the public from an imminent
threat.
B.

The Special Needs Doctrine: Closer, but Maybe Not?

A tip of an impending terrorist attack utilizing a car bomb
unquestionably implicates vital public safety interests. As a result, the
special needs doctrine is the most logical exception to the normal Fourth

47.

See id. at 234-35.

48. See id. at 245-46.
49. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
50. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990) ("[W]here
a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context." (quoting
Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989))); see also MacWade v.
Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 269-75 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Amendment warrant and probable cause requirement that might justify a
seizure and/or search of the target vehicle in response to an anonymous
tip. 5' This doctrine permits the government to use checkpoint searches
and other brief and limited investigatory intrusions absent any
individualized suspicion.5 2 The primary purpose of a special needs
search must be the protection of the public, and not the collection of
evidence. 3 This might seem like an exception that swallows the rule,
but it is not. The Supreme Court has been relatively vigilant in
gatekeeping by rejecting asserted public safety justifications when it
appears the special needs search was utilized as a subterfuge to avoid the
burden of establishing individualized suspicion in order to search for
evidence of criminal misconduct.5 4 The Supreme Court has, however,
indicated that this exception would be applicable to checkpoint searches
in response to a credible threat of imminent terrorist attack. 5 Such use
was subsequently held lawful in MacWade v. Kelly,56 where the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld random checkpoint searches of subway
patrons in New York City in response to a concern that the United States

51. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 73-75 (2001). The Court
stated:
The term "special needs" first appeared in Justice Blackmun's opinion
concurring in the judgment in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985).
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed with the Court that there are
limited exceptions to the probable-cause requirement, in which reasonableness
is determined by "a careful balancing of governmental and private interests,"
but concluded that such a test should only be applied "in those exceptional
circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause
requirement
impracticable .... " Ibid This Court subsequently adopted the "special needs"
terminology in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (plurality
opinion), and Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987), concluding that,
in limited circumstances, a search unsupported by either warrant or probable
cause can be constitutional when "special needs" other than the normal need for
law enforcement provide sufficient justification. See also Vernonia School
Dist. 47Jv.Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995).
Id. at 74 n.7; see also Neumeyer v. Beard, 421 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 2005).
52. Neumeyer, 421 F.3d at 214 ("Under this standard, the constitutionality of a
particular search 'is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests' beyond
that of typical law enforcement." (quoting Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366,
3 73-74 (3d Cir. 1998))).
53. Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stem, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 813-15 (2004).
54. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,40-42 (2000).
55. See id. at 44 ("The exigencies created by [terrorism] scenarios are far removed
from the circumstances under which authorities might simply stop cars as a matter of
course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the jurisdiction.").
56. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 268-69, 275 (2d Cir. 2006).
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would be targeted for a subway attack following the London subway
attack."
It is unsurprising that the special needs exception has been invoked
in response to threats of terrorist attacks to justify checkpoint searches.
The exception arose in response to the Supreme Court's recognition that
there are some threats to society that cannot be adequately deterred
without deviating from the normal individualized
suspicion
requirement.5" However, it is precisely because this exception allows for
random searches that the Court has imposed limits on its use, the most
important of which is the primary purpose requirement: the government
must establish that responding to a legitimate public safety risk is the
primary purpose of the random inspection program. 9 If, as in New York
City, the government is able to identify a credible terrorist car bomb
threat, the special needs exception would almost certainly permit the use
of random checkpoints to conduct limited searches to deter would-be
terrorists and reduce the risk that vehicles entering a certain area were in
fact weaponized.6 °
A response to an anonymous car bomb tip would almost certainly
fall within a legitimate "primary purpose" of ensuring the safety of
police and the public, and not discovery of evidence. 61 However, it is not
clear whether the individualized suspicion established by the tip
(although insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion under existing
standards) undermines the viability of this exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirement. It is clear that a response to such a tip does
not involve the type of random intrusion normally associated with
application of this exception to counter-terrorist checkpoint searches,
such as the random bag checks used to deter terrorist attacks on the New
York City subway system. Instead, reaction to a tip indicates some level
of individualized suspicion. While the special needs exception has been
utilized in response to credible indicators of imminent terrorist attack
(which could arguably be provided by the tip), even in these situations
there is an absence of individualized suspicion.62
Individualized suspicion ultimately may not impact the viability of
invoking the special needs doctrine to respond to a car bomb tip.
However, it may trigger a derivative requirement to establish reasonable

57.
58.
59.

See id.
See id. at 271-72.
See Gould & Stem, supra note 53, at 813-15.

60.

See MacWade, 460 F.3d at 268-69.

61. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454-55 (1990) (holding that
checkpoints that, on balance, weigh more heavily in favor of public safety over public
intrusion do not constitute an unconstitutional search for evidence).
62. See id. at 454.
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suspicion to justify a responsive search or seizure even within the special
needs context. Indeed, the case considered the "birth" of the special
needs doctrine, New Jersey v. T.L. .,63where the Court held that the
search of a public school student's purse was reasonable without a
warrant or probable cause, suggests just such a requirement.64 In T.L. 0.,
the principal clearly had established individualized suspicion. However,
the Court did require that the search be supported by what appears to be
reasonable suspicion, noting that "[w]here a careful balancing of
governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best
served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops
short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a
standard., 6' Thus, T.L.O. seems to indicate that while special needs-a
compelling public interest-will justify deviation from the normal
warrant and probable cause requirement, if the government official has
established individualized suspicion, that suspicion must at least qualify
as "reasonable." Later applications of the special needs exception
addressed a quite different situation: the absence of any individualized
suspicion coupled with a compelling public interest to conduct
suspicionless inspections.
Indeed, it is the inability to establish
individualized suspicion that seems to be a common element of many of
the situations falling within the exception, and in many ways creates the
special need.66
Accordingly, extending the special needs exception to this type of
situation is problematic. Unlike in TL.O., the individualized suspicion
created by corroboration of the existing details provided by an
anonymous car bomb tip would fail to provide the minimal indicia of
reliability necessary to render even a protective Terry-type search
reasonable. Thus, application of the exception would allow a search
based on what is currently insufficient information to justify the
intrusion, and would therefore encourage the type of end run around the
substantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment that67 the Court has
guarded against when limiting application of the doctrine.

63. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
64. See id.
65. See id. at 341.
66. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-50.
67. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 68-69 (2001) (holding that
drawing the blood of pregnant patients "for the specific purpose of incriminating those
patients" for illegal drug use was a violation of the "closely guarded category of [the]
special needs" to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) ("When law
enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at
checkpoints.., stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized
suspicion.").
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If the existence of individualized suspicion does require the
establishment of reasonable suspicion as a predicate for invoking the

special needs doctrine in response to an anonymous tip, something more
than the tip would be required to render a seizure or search reasonable. 68

In other words, if the police know where they want to search, the special
needs exception may provide an exception to the normal warrant and

probable cause requirement, but would not totally eliminate the
requirement for establishing at least some objectively verifiable cause.69
Thus, for example, if the police receive an anonymous tip of a car bomb

location, use of the special needs exception to seize or search that vehicle
or others suspected of matching the tip description might not be

reasonable even conceding a primary protective purpose.7 ° Establishing
reasonable suspicion, therefore, to support a carefully limited
investigatory response to an anonymous car bomb tip, would seem to
provide the necessary ingredient to render the response reasonable.
C.

Anonymous Tips, Existing Facts, andReasonable Suspicion

The exceptions above leave a gap between the probable cause-and
accompanying exceptions-needed for a full evidentiary search and the

lack of individualized suspicion that justifies the special needs exception.
The investigatory and protective needs of the anonymous tip highlighted
68. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
69. See id; see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2081-82 (2011). In
Ashcroft, Justice Scalia suggested that the absence of individualized suspicion is an
aspect of a valid special needs program:
Apart from those cases, we have almost uniformly rejected invitations to probe
subjective intent. There is one category of exception, upon which the Court of
Appeals principally relied. In Edmond, we held that the Fourth Amendment
could not condone suspicionless vehicle checkpoints set up for the purpose of
detecting illegal narcotics. Although we had previously approved vehicle
checkpoints set up for the purpose of keeping off the road unlicensed drivers, or
alcohol-impaired drivers; and for the purpose of interdicting those who illegally
cross the border; we found the drug-detection purpose in Edmond invalidating
because it was ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime
control. In the Court of Appeals' view, Edmond established that programmatic
purpose is relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis of programs of seizures
without probable cause.
That was mistaken. It was not the absence of probable cause that triggered the
invalidating-purpose inquiry in Edmond. To the contrary, Edmond explicitly
said that it would approve checkpoint stops for general crime control purposes
that were based upon merely some quantum of individualized suspicion.
Purpose was relevant in Edmond because programmatic purposes may be
relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuantto
a general scheme without individualizedsuspicion.
Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2081 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. See Gould & Stern, supra note 53, at 818-23.
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by the opening hypothetical fall into this gap. However, because of the
unquestioned protective purpose of any investigatory response to such a
tip, the situation seems to also implicate the Terry doctrine, which could
provide a justification for a carefully limited search to "confirm or deny"
the imminent threat of violent harm to police and others. In Terry v.
Ohio,7 1 the Supreme Court held that a cursory inspection for the purposes
of protecting police or others around them from a threat of violent crime
is justified on the lower threshold characterized by the Court as
reasonable suspicion.72 Unlike probable cause, reasonable suspicion
relies heavily on police instincts and intuition, requiring only that those
instincts and intuition be based on some objective articulable fact.73 If
the car that police suspect contains a bomb is treated as the analogue to
the suspect's outer clothing in Terry, then a search sufficient in scope to
confirm or deny the risk that the car is "armed and dangerous" would
appear to be a legitimate extension of the doctrine. In the alternative,
reasonable suspicion would seem to satisfy the causal requirement for
invoking the special needs doctrine after establishing individualized
suspicion. There are, however, two obstacles to relying on the Terry
doctrine to justify a seizure or search in response to a car bomb tip. First,
based on existing jurisprudence, corroborating openly available existing
information (as opposed to a prediction of future conduct) provided by
the tip is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Second, if a
search of the automobile's concealed interior is necessary to confirm or
deny the car bomb risk, the scope of the intrusion becomes
indistinguishable from a full-blown evidentiary search.
Two Supreme Court decisions analyzing whether an anonymous tip
established reasonable suspicion indicate the insufficiency of the type of
tip hypothesized in this Article: Alabama v. White74 and Florida v. JL.
In White, the Court held that corroboration of a tip's predictive but
openly available information did not establish probable cause.76 Unlike
Gates, the openly available information precluded the conclusion that the
71. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
72. See id. at 27. The Court stated:
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer
need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether
a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger.
Id.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983); Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
See White, 496 U.S. at 332.
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informant obtained the information as the result of "insider access" to the
alleged criminal activity. 7
The Court did, however, hold that
corroboration of even openly available predictive information provided
sufficient indicia of reliability to establish the lower standard of
reasonable suspicion.78 As a result, while the police were justified in
conducting a brief investigatory seizure of the defendant to confirm or
deny this suspicion, there was insufficient cause to justify a full search of
the defendant's automobile based solely on the tip.7 9
In J.L., the Court addressed the effect of a tip that did not even
provide the type of open source predictions of future activities involved
in White.80 In that case, police responded to an anonymous tip that an
individual was currently located at a specifically identified bus stop
wearing a particular article of clothing, and that this individual was
carrying a concealed weapon.8 ' When police arrived at the location
provided by the tip, they observed a suspect matching the description
provided by the informant.8 2 Police then seized the suspect and frisked
him for weapons, resulting in discovery of the concealed weapon and
arrest of the suspect.83 The Supreme Court held that both the seizure and
search were unreasonable, concluding that the tip was insufficient to
even establish reasonable suspicion pursuant to the White standard. 4 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that nothing about the tip
was even predictive.85 Instead, all the police had corroborated were facts
that anyone could see and report: that someone was standing at a bus
stop wearing a certain article of clothing. 6 As a result, the tip provided
no objective basis for a reviewing court to validate the reasonableness of
the police suspicion it generated.
Applying these precedents to the hypothetical addressed in this
Article that corroboration of an anonymous tip that a car containing a
77. Id. (noting that anyone can report apparent and readily available facts that
preexist at the time of a tip).
78. See id. ("What was important was the caller's ability to predict respondent's
future behavior, because it demonstrated inside information-a special familiarity with
respondent's affairs.").
79. See id. ("Although it is a close case, we conclude that under the totality of the
circumstances the anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify the investigatory stop of respondent's car.").
80. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 271 ("The tip in the instant case lacked the moderate indicia of
reliability present in White and essential to the Court's decision in that case.").
85. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 ("The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no
predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant's
knowledge or credibility.").
86. See id.
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bomb is parked at a certain location fails to establish not only probable
cause, but also reasonable suspicion. As a result, even a vehicle
analogue of a Terry seizure and/or Terry search-as opposed to a fullblown evidentiary search justified by probable cause-would not be
reasonable. Nor is this conclusion altered by application of either the
automobile exception or the exigent circumstances exception, both of
which rely fundamentally on the existence of probable cause.
If police receive a generalized tip of an imminent car bomb attack,
random checkpoint searches would almost certainly be considered a
reasonable response. If however, the tip provides specific focus for the
police that a particular vehicle at a particular location contained a car
bomb, a focus verified by corroborating investigation, the individualized
suspicion would foreclose use of the special needs exception. And,
based on the existing standards established by Alabama v. White and
Floridav. J.L., confirming that the vehicle identified by the informant is
in fact at the alleged location will not be sufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion. Nonetheless, doing nothing in response to such a tip seems
itself unreasonable. Accordingly, some compromise is necessary-a
compromise that aligns the need to respond effectively to such threats
with the test for reasonableness.
Il.

NEED AND RESPONSE: SHOULD REASONABLENESS TURN ON
EMERGING THREATS?

At first blush, a proposal adjusting the test for assessing Fourth
Amendment reasonableness in order to satisfy the investigatory needs of
law enforcement may seem radical.
However, existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence indicates that the meaning of reasonableness
must be responsive to the pragmatic realities of law enforcement
investigations.8 7 Both Gates and Terry were built on just such a
pragmatic foundation.88 Indeed, in setting the conditions for adopting a
more flexible continuum of cause to justify a cursory search, the Terry
Court emphasized the importance of adopting a more workable standard
to meet the realistic needs of law enforcement. 89 The Court noted that
requiring a unitary probable cause standard for any search-and
excluding evidence obtained without satisfying that standard-would be
an ineffective deterrent to such searches when the police perceived the

87. See Anthony C. Coveney, When the Immovable Object Meets the Unstoppable
Force: Search and Seizure in the Age of Terrorism, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 329, 373-81
(2007).
88. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-44 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30-31 (1968).
89. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
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need to conduct the search as more compelling than the need to preserve
evidence for admission at trial:
The exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of
[I]n some contexts, the rule is ineffective as a
judicial control ....
deterrent. Street encounters between citizens and police officers are
incredibly rich in diversity.... [A] stem refusal by this Court to
condone such activity does not necessarily render it responsive to the
exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective the rule may be where
obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, it is
powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights
where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing
to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other
goal.
Proper adjudication of cases in which the exclusionary rule is
invoked demands a constant awareness of these limitations.... [A]
rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile
protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to
control, may exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of
efforts to prevent crime. No judicial opinion can comprehend the
encounter, and we can only judge the
protean variety of the street
9
facts of the case before us. 0
Terry therefore supports the conclusion that a modified test for
determining when an informant's tip is sufficient to trigger an
investigation of an impending terrorist car bomb attack is consistent with
This
the reasonableness touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. 91
modification would permit suspicion to be considered reasonable based
on independent verification of the car bomb location, without requiring
validation of predictions beyond the location and description of the
vehicle provided by the tip.92 When coupled with the scope inherent in
the protective purpose of a search conducted pursuant to Terry,93 a

90. Id. at 13-15 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
91. See id. at 30-31. It is undisputed that Terry did not lower the threshold of cause
that renders a full evidentiary search reasonable. Nor will this Article argue for such an
outcome.

Instead, it proposes offsetting the expanded search authority of an adjusted

standard of reasonable suspicion and an accordant scope expansion with a limited-use
doctrine for evidence seized during a search based on this reduced quantum of proof.
Accordingly, the proposal will mitigate the resulting increased risk to privacy.

In so

doing, it strikes a reasonable balance between the authority to conduct what may in effect
be indistinguishable from a full evidentiary search in reliance on such tips and the liberty
interests of the public.
92. But see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
93. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
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prompt and decisive law enforcement reaction
to such a tip not only
94
would be logical, but also legally reasonable.
Accordingly, aligning the definition of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness with the legitimate needs of law enforcement and society
is anything but radical, but rather is consistent with the core rationale of
the Terry doctrine. In Terry, the Court held that the quantum of cause for
reasonable suspicion rendered reasonable a brief investigatory seizure
and cursory protective pat down-what the Court indicated was
euphemistically known as a stop and frisk. 95 Subsequent decisions by
the Court extended the Terry protective search rationale to other
contexts. For example, police are permitted to conduct not only a
cursory pat down of the clothing of an individual they suspect is armed
and dangerous, but also a "protective" sweep of the interior of a home
following arrest of an occupant based on reasonable suspicion there are
confederates in the home who could endanger the officers. 96 Similarly,
police are permitted to perform a cursory inspection of the interior
compartment of an automobile following a traffic stop, prior to allowing
the driver back into the car, based on reasonable suspicion that a weapon
may be in a readily accessible location.97
All of these extensions of Terry search authority still require,
however, reasonable suspicion that the officers or others face a genuine
risk. If, as noted above, corroboration of existing facts provided by an
anonymous tip is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, the
essential predicate for considering extending Terry authority to a
responsive search or seizure of a suspected car bomb would be lacking.
It is for this reason that in this unique context, such corroboration should
be sufficient to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion.
A.

A Terrorism-Specific Test for Reasonable Suspicion?

What transforms mere suspicion to reasonable suspicion? This
inquiry was a key aspect of the Terry decision, and while the exact
meaning of reasonable suspicion remains somewhat cryptic, two
requirements seem clear. First, the suspicion must be based on some

94. See also MIL. R. EVID. 313(b).
95. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
96. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) ("[A]s an incident to [an] arrest the
officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from
which an attack could be immediately launched.").
97. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983) ("[T]he balancing required
by Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the
passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess an articulable and
objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.").
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objectively verifiable fact in order to facilitate subsequent judicial
validation.98 Second, as a result, pure subjective police instinct could
never be sufficient. As the Court noted:
And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes
meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of
those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more
detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
And in making that assessment it is
particular circumstances.
imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure
or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that
Anything less would invite
the action taken was appropriate?
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing
hunches, a result this Court has
more substantial than inarticulate
99
consistently refused to sanction.

Thus, according to Terry, an officer's subjective suspicion becomes
constitutionally reasonable when it is derived from objective facts that
reasonably validate the suspicion-facts that are subsequently verifiable
by a reviewing court assessing the reasonableness of the suspicion.10 0
Normally, police observations of activity that seems suspicious
produce the constitutionally required objective fact that renders the
suspicion reasonable and justifies a brief investigatory seizure-or, in
more limited circumstances, a protective cursory search for weapons or
other sources of imminent danger. However, just as police must often
rely on informants to establish probable cause, reasonable suspicion may
sometimes result from an informant's tip. Because, however, the
standard of reasonable suspicion is lower than that of probable cause, in
Alabama v. White the Court endorsed an analogous reduction in the
detail and quality of the tip when police rely on it to establish reasonable
suspicion.1 °1
To establish reasonable suspicion, however, corroboration of the
tip's predictions-even if the nature of the predictions did not indicate
insider access to the suspect's criminal activity-seemed to be essential.
98. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ("[ln justifying the particular intrusion the police
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.").
99. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
100. See id.
101. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1990).
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The Court subsequently confirmed this in Floridav. J.L. in a unanimous
opinion, ruling that a stop and frisk resulting from a non-predictive tip
violated the Fourth Amendment. 10 2 The Court distinguished the case
from White precisely because the information provided was both publicly
available and non-predictive. 10 3 As a result, it provided no objective
basis for police to conclude that the assertion of concealed criminal
activity was reliable. Furthermore, the fact that the police validated the
reliability of the tip after the frisk was irrelevant, because this in no way
related to the reliability of the tip at the time the police commenced the
intrusion. According to the Court:
The tip in the instant case lacked the moderate indicia of reliability
present in White and essential to the Court's decision in that case.
The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive
information and therefore left the police without means to test the
informant's knowledge or credibility. That the allegation about the
gun turned out to be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to
the frisks, had a reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging in
unlawful conduct: The reasonableness of official suspicion must be
measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their
search. All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of
an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he
knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside
information about J.L. If White was a close case on the reliability of
anonymous tips, this one surely falls on the other side of the line.
Thus, the combination of anonymity of the source and the non-predictive
nature of the information corroborated by independent police
investigation provided nothing objective to transform subjective
suspicion into reasonable suspicion. 10 5 In this regard, the Court
emphasized that a tip cannot provide reasonable suspicion merely
because police verify it is accurate in identifying an individual; what is
required is police validation that the assertion of concealed criminality is
reliable, which requires more from the tip than merely providing open
non-predictive information:

102. Florida v. J.L, 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000) ("[W]e hold that an anonymous tip
lacking indicia of reliability... does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it
alleges the illegal possession of a firearm.").
103. See id. at 269-72.
104. Id. at 271.
105. See Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and Three-Dollar Steaks: The
Subjective/Objective Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 751, 774 (2010) ("[A] police officer's subjective good faith is
insufficient to validate law enforcement techniques that do not satisfy objective standards
of conduct.").
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An accurate description of a subject's readily observable location and
appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the
police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse.
Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of
concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue
requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in
its tendency to identify a determinate person. 106
Applying this same reasoning to the hypothetical anonymous tip that a
car bomb is located at a certain location, even if the tip describes the
location and the vehicle with precise detail, JL. suggests that police
corroboration of these facts would fail to establish not only probable
cause, but even reasonable suspicion.
In JL, the state, however, offered an alternate rationale for the
search based on the fact that, unlike in White, police were not suspicious
of drug possession, but of weapon possession. According to the state,
the nature of the danger associated with weapon possession justified a
reduced standard to establish reasonable suspicion-a theory directly on
point, if not more compelling, with the car bomb hypothetical. °7 The
Court rejected this proposed "firearm exception," suggesting that the
nature of the threat cannot alter the assessment of what amounts to
reasonable suspicion:
A second major argument advanced by Florida and the United States
as amicus is, in essence, that the standard Terry analysis should be
modified to license a "firearm exception." Under such an exception,
a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if the
accusation would fail standard
We
08 pre-search reliability testing.
decline to adopt this position. 1
This aspect of the decision was not, however, broad enough to
categorically foreclose the possibility of the modification the state
proposed.
While the Court rejected the proposed adjustment to
reasonable suspicion in the case of a tip of an armed suspect, it offered
an important qualifier, one directly on point with the proposal of this
article:
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the
circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip
might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of
reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a person
carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a

106. I.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
107.

See id.

108.

Id.
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report of a person carrying 0 a9 firearm before the police can
constitutionally conduct a frisk.1
This qualifier opens a window that logically extends to the threat of
serious terrorist attacks. The Court suggested that the level of reliability
required to establish reasonable suspicion to justify a cursory search of a
person suspected of carrying a bomb may be lowered from that normally
required to search even a person suspected of being armed. Why would
this be reasonable? The answer seems clear: the nature of the threat
alters the assessment of what qualifies as a reasonable police response.
If the threat is one armed individual, that will produce suspicion of some
risk to police and possibly bystanders, but not enough suspicion to justify
a Fourth Amendment intrusion based on the tip alone. However, if the
same type of tip produces suspicion of a threat on a much higher order of
magnitude-the type of threat resulting from a suicide bomber-then the
reduced indicia of reliability would not be the exclusive focus of the
reasonableness assessment. Instead, the threat itself, and perhaps more
importantly what a reasonable officer would be expected by society to do
in response to such a threat, would be an additional element in the
analysis.
If such a non-predictive tip from a source of unknown
veracity/credibility may be sufficient to justify a cursory search of an
individual for the exclusive protective purpose, it would seem even more
reasonable to justify a protective cursory search of an automobile. Not
only are automobiles traditionally considered to carry a reduced
expectation of privacy, 10 but it also seems axiomatic that the gravity of a
bomb risk would be substantially greater for a car bomb than for an
individual suicide bomber.'11 Thus, the qualifier offered by the Court in
J.L. seems to be the ideal foundation for resolving the dilemma of police
response to the anonymous tip of a car bomb.
Unless such a threat-based test for reasonable suspicion is adopted,
the inherent incongruity between what police will consider a reasonable
response to a car bomb tip and what is lawfully permitted will persist.

109. Id. at 273-74.
110. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1985) (noting that a vehicle's
(1) ready mobility and (2) "use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police
regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling" are the two traditional justifications for the
automobile exception); see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976)
("Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the
expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that
relating to one's home or office.").
I 11. Compare VBIEDs, supra note 5, with Suicide Bombs, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://bit.ly/lapfuiWj (last visited Aug. 26, 2013).
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Eliminating such an incongruity is consistent
with the rationale that led
1 2
the Court to endorse the Terry doctrine.
However, allowing a search-even if cursory and limited in scope
to protecting the police and public--on what in any other context would
not even amount to reasonable suspicion also implicates another concern
addressed in Terry: the risk of police abuse. In Terry, the Court
compensated for this risk by establishing the reasonable suspicion
requirement, which as the Court noted would preserve the role of the
judiciary in checking police abuse by requiring the police to establish
some objective basis for the suspicion that led to the minimal intrusion.
According to the Court:
Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional responsibility
to guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or
which trenches upon personal security without the objective
evidentiaryjustificationwhich the Constitution requires. When such

conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary
and its
113
fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.
Adopting a test for reasonable suspicion that does not even satisfy the
minimal requirements of Alabama v. White-a test that would validate
the type of anonymous non-predictive tip ruled insufficient in Florida v.
J.L.-would effectively nullify this limited judicial oversight function.
J.L.-type tips provide virtually no indicia of reliability derived from the
informant's track record of accuracy or the informant's basis of
knowledge of the suspect's activities (by verifying predictions made by
the informant). As a result, there is no objective indicator of reliability
for a court to assess in a subsequent suppression hearing, thus
eviscerating the inherent limit on the risk of police misconduct built into
the Terry doctrine. All a court could consider in such a case is the
reliability of identifying a determinate person or thing, which, as the
Court noted in JL., in no way provides an objective indicator of the
reliability of the informant's assertion of concealed criminal activity.
Nonetheless, because delaying a response to even this limited indication
of an impending mass casualty car bomb attack is itself inherently
unreasonable, extending the threat-based adjustment to a Fourth
Amendment principle as suggested in JL. seems essential. Even
assuming, however, that corroborating the existing facts provided by an
anonymous car bomb tip will establish reasonable suspicion, the
112. See David A. Harris, ParticularizedSuspicion, CategoricalJudgments: Supreme
Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
975, 981-87 (1998) (noting that Terry was a "grand compromise" to address this
dilemma).
113. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (emphasis added).
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reasonable scope of the permissible response will also present a Fourth
Amendment challenge.
B.

Scope: A Logical Expansion

Objectively reasonable suspicion that the officer, or those around
the officer, faces danger of immediate violent harm is the substantive
justification for all Terry-based searches. But scope is also a critical
element related to the reasonableness of these searches. In each context,
the Court has endorsed a search that will often result in discovery of
contraband or other evidence precisely because the primary purpose of
the search is not to discover evidence in order to build a case-a true
evidentiary search-but instead to protect life. 114 The scope of such
searches, therefore, may not extend beyond what is necessary to confirm
or deny the suspicion of this imminent danger. How then, can this twopronged justification for the Terry search apply to the car bomb
anonymous tip dilemma? The answer must involve more than merely
adjustment to the substantive requirements for establishing reasonable
suspicion; it also requires rethinking the scope of a permissible Terry
search of an automobile in response to the car bomb threat. Only in so
doing is it possible to achieve the underlying rationale of Terry in the
terrorism tip context.
The reasonableness of any Terry-based search or seizure has always
been contingent on the narrowly tailored scope of the intrusion. Terry
stops, defined as brief investigatory seizures, are limited in duration to
the amount of time reasonably necessary to confirm or deny the
suspicion.' 5 Terry searches were originally limited to a cursory patdown of the suspect's outer clothing to confirm or deny the suspicion
that the suspect is armed and dangerous1 1 6 and subsequently extended to
other contexts. 1 7 In all of these situations, the scope of the Terry search
authorization is carefully limited to only those places police must
reasonably search to exclude the risk of imminent potential harm. The
Supreme Court's consistent emphasis of this limited scope has always
been motivated by the need to prevent the Terry search from becoming a
114. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 483, 552-53 (1995)
(noting that, as the doctrine developed, the Court became more interested in officer safety
than the invasion of privacy).
115. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.
116. Seeid.at30.
117. See Daniel C. Isaacs, Miranda's Application to the Expanding Terry Stop, 18 J.L.
& POL'Y 383, 387-93 (2009) (noting that the propensity of lower courts to defer to officer
safety on a case-by-case basis led to the progressive expansion of Terry after the initial
decision in 1968).
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substitute for a full evidentiary search. When, however, a genuine
protective purpose exists, the Court has been favorably inclined to extend
the scope of a Terry-based search to situations beyond just a cursory pat
down of an individual suspected of being armed and dangerous. Indeed,
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Terry emphasized that when a Terry
seizure is predicated upon reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed
and dangerous, the protective search should be automatic:
Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk must be
immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an
articulable suspicion of a crime of violence. Just as a full search
incident to a lawful arrest requires no additional justification, a
limited frisk incident to a lawful stop must often be rapid and routine.
There is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting
a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to118ask one
question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.
Justice Harlan's automatic search approach may be the pragmatic reality
of Terry in practice, but the Court has never adopted this justification for
a Terry search. Instead, reasonable suspicion must be established to
justify the search. Nonetheless, Justice Harlan's recognition that, once a
suspect is detained based on reasonable suspicion that violent crime is
afoot, the police must be granted almost absolute discretion to engage in
a Terry-based search to protect police and others from imminent harma protective search-is logical. Any other approach would inject a
dangerous level of hesitation into the decision-making processhesitation that Justice Harlan (and the Terry majority) recognized might
prove deadly.
Extending this reasoning to the car bomb context would first require
an assertion of control over the vehicle. Police could cordon the area and
prevent access to the vehicle, which would qualify as a seizure." 9 The
reasonable suspicion justifying the seizure would, as in Terry, almost
always then automatically justify a protective search. How then should
the reasonable scope of that search be defined?
In Michigan v. Long,120 the Supreme Court addressed the scope of a
Terry-based protective search of an automobile, and endorsed a cursory
inspection of a limited area of the automobile interior.' 21 However, it is
critical to note that the justification for that search was unrelated to the

118. Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
119. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("A seizure of property
occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests in that property.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
121. See id. at 1049.
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justification for the initial stop-the stop was independently justified
based on a traffic violation. Thus, Long offers two important guideposts
for resolving this scope question. First, a car, like an individual, may be
the subject of a Terry protective search. Second, as in Terry itself, the
scope of that search must be assessed based on the threat associated with
the car. In Long, the threat was ready access to a weapon when the
driver re-entered the car. 122 Accordingly, the scope of the search was
limited to those areas not observable from the exterior of the car where a
driver might gain immediate access to a weapon.123 It would be
erroneous, however, to read Long as foreclosing a search of other
concealed areas of the car in all situations. Instead, the reasonableness of
such an expanded scope must be contingent on the threat triggering the
reasonable suspicion.
In the case of an automobile seized on suspicion of being a car
bomb, the type of limited search conducted in Long will be insufficient
to respond to the threat. Ideally, evidence of the bomb will be
observable from the exterior of the automobile (as occurred in the Times
Square case), 124 either by the naked eye or with the aid of some sensory
enhancement, such as a dog trained to detect explosives. In this
situation, even if the police must seize the automobile while conducting
the observation (which will only be the case if they meaningfully
interfere with a possessory interest), the external observation will
produce probable cause, and the subsequent search of the automobile
will be reasonable absent a warrant based on either the exigent
circumstances or the automobile exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Any contraband observed during that probable cause search will then be
subject to plain
view seizure pursuant to existing Fourth Amendment
25
principles. 1
If, however, police respond to a car bomb tip and cannot confirm or
deny the presence of a bomb in the automobile with external observation,
the automobile becomes the physical analogue of the hypothetical
suicide bomber in Florida v. J.L.126 In this situation, simply seizing the
automobile might be insufficient to achieve the legitimate protective
purpose triggered by the tip. Instead, police must be authorized to
conduct a search into concealed areas of the automobile where a bomb
may be located. This would permit, for example, police to use some
122. See id., 463 U.S. at 1048 ("[W]e ... expressly recognize[] that suspects may
injure police officers and others by virtue of their access to weapons, even though they
may not themselves be armed.").
123. See id.
124. See Baker & Rashbaum, supra note 3.
125. See supra note 38.
126. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
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intrusive capability to penetrate the trunk or the concealed portions of the
passenger compartment to search for evidence of a bomb. If identified,
further action would be justified based on a probable cause-based plain
view seizure of the contraband or the vehicle itself. If, as Floridav. JL.
suggests, the search of an individual suspected of carrying a bomb would
be reasonable based on a non-predictive anonymous tip,1 27 then it seems
only logical that an analogous search of an automobile would also be
reasonable based on the same information. While the scope of the search
would certainly be more expansive than that endorsed in Michigan v.
Long, reasonableness would turn on the relationship of the scope to the
threat-a consistent
thread that runs through all Terry protective search
128
jurisprudence.
These adjustments-to both the substantive requirement for
establishing reasonable suspicion and the scope of the permissible
response triggered by reasonable suspicion of a car bomb attack-will
also significantly expand the authority of police to search automobiles on
the bare minimum of objectively verifiable suspicion. As a result, these
adjustments will in large measure nullify existing limitations on the
opportunity to, and consequence of, invocation of the Terry doctrine,
potentially allowing for the introduction of incriminating evidence
wholly unrelated to the alleged terrorist suspicion. In response, I propose
that some alternate method of checking abuse of this search justification
is required. Because permitting the police to base that judgment on such
minimal objective indicia of an anonymous tip's reliability will disable
meaningful judicial critique of police judgment, the alternate method
should take the form of a limitation on the use of evidence derived from
the protective search.
When coupled with a limitation on admissibility of evidence found
in plain view but unrelated to the threat that triggered the proposed
protective search, this expansion of Terry search authority strikes a
reasonable balance between protecting the public and protecting the
individual from subterfuge or the lying informant. The law will
authorize what is, by any measure, a reasonable response to a tip of an
impending terrorist attack in an era where the threat of the lone wolf selfradicalized terrorist poses an increasingly serious risk. But the law will
also impose a rational limitation to prevent this search based on minimal
objectively verifiable suspicion to be used as a ploy to target individuals
and avoid the otherwise more demanding requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.

127.

See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2000).

128.

See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
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IV. PROTECTIONS AGAINST OVER-BREADTH: LIMITING THE USE OF
EVIDENCE SEIZED DURING A PROTECTIVE VEHICLE SEARCH

Extending the protective Terry search into concealed areas of an
automobile in such situations would certainly enhance police efforts to
neutralize the threat of terrorist car bombs or other weapons capable of
inflicting mass casualties. However, this expansion will also permit the
police to conduct what will in practice be indistinguishable from a full
evidentiary search of the vehicle on a quantum of proof that has never
been considered sufficient to justify such an intrusion. 129 Terrorism is
therefore not the exclusive risk implicated by empowering police to
engage in timely and effective response to these type of anonymous tips;
permitting search or seizure based on information that lacks even
minimal objective indicia of reliability creates its own risk to liberty and
the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. This risk is inherent in
potential overreaction to the threat of terrorism, 130 police abuse of this
expanded response authority, or even information provided to police to
falsely implicate the target of the tip. It is therefore essential to
recognize the risk.11 Thus, any proposed expansion of government
authority to conduct searches or seizures responsive to the unique threats
of terrorism, and especially the car bomb, should be tailored not only to
facilitate the legitimate police needs, but also to protect the
citizenry
132
from abuse of their constitutional rights via police overreach.
Two possible limitations on the use of evidence seized using this
"terrorism tip" Terry expansion could be adopted to offset this risk. The
first would require exclusion of any evidence seized pursuant to such a
search unless the evidence is relevant to proving a terrorism-related
allegation. Placing police on notice that any evidence of crime unrelated
to their asserted protective search justification will be subject to
exclusion will deter police from invoking this exception absent a genuine
concern of imminent terrorist attack, thereby reducing the risk that police
will use this exception as a subterfuge to avoid normal evidentiary search
requirements. A second alternative would be a more tailored limited-use
rule, triggered when the asserted protective search fails to uncover any
129. See Jeremy J. Calsyn et al., Investigation and Police Practices: Warrantless
Searches and Seizures, 86 GEO. L.J. 1214,1259-63 (1998).
130. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign
Intelligence Model to Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1619 (2004)
(arguing that the threat of domestic terrorism has resulted in the government adopting
investigatory methods heretofore limited to government counter-terrorism operations
conducted outside the United States).
131. See generally Vernon Elledge, Searches and Seizures-Evidence Illegally
ObtainedInadmissiblein Criminal Trial, 5 TEX. L. REv. 424 (1927).
132. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment FirstPrinciples, 107 HARv.
L. REv. 757 (1994).
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evidence related to the alleged terrorist threat, but does result in the
seizure of unrelated contraband. In such cases, admissibility of this
unrelated contraband evidence against a defendant will require the
prosecution to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
protective search was in fact legitimate and not a pretense to avoid the
normal reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment.133 The
first of these limitations would certainly penalize the police for invoking
alleged car bomb reasonable suspicion as a subterfuge to pursue a hunch
or to otherwise harass an individual. However, it is also a draconian
limitation, depriving the government of the opportunity to utilize highly
probative evidence against a defendant simply because the police
suspicion proved to be erroneous, with no proof of police bad faith.
Such an extreme limitation would certainly run counter to the ongoing
Supreme Court trend to relax the impact of the exclusionary rule. 134 In
contrast, the alternative limitation-triggering a presumption of
inadmissibility whenever a suspect establishes that she was the target of
police suspicion unrelated to a bomb threat-is less extreme, but also
less protective. Once this pre-existing suspicion is established, evidence
seized during the asserted protective search will be admissible only if the
government establishes by clear and convincing evidence the search was
unrelated to the pre-existing suspicion.'35
A.

Evidence Exclusion: The Ultimate Subterfuge Deterrent

Of these two options for protecting against police abuse, the
absolute exclusionary rule would provide the strongest deterrent against
133. Cf United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1991) ("As
long as . . . [seizure] pursuant to the community caretaking function is not a mere
subterfuge for investigation, the coexistence of investigatory and caretaking motives will
not invalidate the seizure.").
134. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v.
Michigan and Its Ancestors, 93 IowA L. REv. 1741, 1768 (2008) (going so far as to
question whether the Supreme Court--or some legislative body-may "scrap" the
exclusionary rule in its entirety).
135. As noted above, this presumptive inadmissibility approach is based on Military
Rule of Evidence 313, which establishes a limitation on the use of evidence at courtmartial seized during the course of a military inspection. Because command inspections
are an important and routine aspect of military life, the use of inspections to bypass the
normal probable cause requirement for conducting an evidentiary search creates a
genuine risk of command abuse of service members' rights, the same type of risk
inherent in a threat-based reasonable suspicion standard. A military inspection is
authorized for the primary purpose of ensuring the health, welfare, and fitness for duty of
the military unit, not for the discovery of evidence of criminal activity. In this regard, the
inspection is the military analogue to the special needs doctrine. Accordingly, when
evidence of criminal activity is discovered during an inspection, that evidence is normally
admissible at trial by court-martial precisely because its discovery was not the primary
purpose of the intrusion. See Ma. R. EVID. 313.
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police subterfuge. This rule would be based on the premise that
discovery of the contraband that generated the protective search-a
bomb or bomb-making materials-would be required as a post-hoc
validation of the tip's reliability (the outcome proposed by Florida in
Florida v. J.L. but rejected by the Court). 13 6 That discovery would
validate the police reliance on the tip and render the search reasonable by
excluding the inference that either the tipster "set up" a fellow citizen, or
that the police fabricated the tip in order to conduct a subterfuge
evidentiary search. Discovery of contraband unrelated to the suspected
threat would, in the alternative, establish that the tip was at best
unreliable, and at worst fabricated as a subterfuge to seize evidence
otherwise beyond the lawful reach of a genuine protective search.
This type of expansive exclusionary rule is, of course, unique in the
context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and also inconsistent with
the Court's aversion to prophylactic rules to protect individual rights.
Under existing law, evidence that comes into plain view during an
otherwise lawful search may be seized and offered at trial regardless of
whether it was what the police expected to find or whether they came
upon it unexpectedly. 37 Exclusion of such evidence is limited to
situations where the evidence comes into plain view as the result of some
predicate police illegality, in which case the cost of excluding probative
evidence is outweighed by the deterrent effect that exclusion will have
on future police misconduct. Following this line of reasoning, if the
proposed threat-based test for reasonable suspicion is adopted, any
contraband police uncover while acting within the scope of a protective
search would be subject to plain view seizure and admission. However,
as suggested above, a protective search based on the type of nonpredictive anonymous tip deemed objectively deficient in J.L.
undermines the efficacy of this normal exclusionary rule equation. In
such situations, there is no meaningful objective basis for a reviewing
court to critique the reasonableness of the police judgment to conduct the
search. Distinguishing good faith from bad faith when contraband other
than that related to the threat that triggered the search is uncovered and
seized therefore becomes almost impossible. Instead, it is the nature of

136. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,271-72 (2000).
137. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1990). The Court stated:
As we have already suggested, by hypothesis the seizure of an object in plain
view does not involve an intrusion on privacy. If the interest in privacy has
been invaded, the violation must have occurred before the object came into
plain view and there is no need for an inadvertence limitation on seizures to
condemn it.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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the potential risk to the public and police that renders reliance on such
minimal evidence objectively reasonable.
This risk-driven reasonableness inquiry, combined with the risk that
the search was the result of some illicit conduct by either the informant
or the police, justifies a post-hoc assessment of reasonableness.
Accordingly, unless the evidence seized indicates the tip was in fact
reliable, admissibility in the prosecution case-in-chief would be
unjustified. This approach would strike a fair balance between a
reasonable protective police response to a tip that cannot be pre-validated
as reliable, and the legitimate interest of the target of the allegedly
protective search to be shielded from the inherent risk associated with
being subjected to a search based on a tip with no objective indicia of
reliability, even a protective search. This is exactly the risk that led the
Court to unanimously conclude the search in JL. was unreasonable.
Where the reasonableness of the police response is validated by
discovery of evidence related to the tip, however, that evidence and any
other evidence discovered in plain view will be admissible because it
validates the tip's reliability.
When only unrelated evidence is
discovered, that evidence will be inadmissible.
This limited-use
approach will send a clear message to police that subterfuge in order to
seize evidence otherwise beyond their reach is futile. Furthermore, it
will not require assessment of police motives, an aspect of
reasonableness analysis the Court has eschewed. 38 Thus, even where
police assume the tip is valid, the rule would protect the citizen not only
from potential police subterfuge, but also from the unscrupulous or
overly paranoid neighbor who fabricates such a tip.
It must, however, be noted that because admissibility of discovered
evidence resulting from such a protective search would be dictated by the
nature of the evidence, this limited-use proposal would prohibit the
introduction of evidence even in the absence of police misconduct. In
other words, it would be irrelevant whether the tip proved unreliable as
the result of a lying or misinformed informant, or deliberate police abuse
of the protective search exception. However, requiring exclusion as a

138. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996) ("Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.");
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). In Robinson, the Court stated:
[I]t is of no moment that [the police officer who conducted the search] did not
indicate any subjective fear of the respondent or that he did not himself suspect
that respondent was armed. Having in the course of a lawful search come upon
the crumpled package of cigarettes, he was entitled to inspect it; and when his
inspection revealed the heroin capsules, he was entitled to seize them as fruits,
instrumentalities, or contraband probative of criminal conduct.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (intemal quotation
marks omitted).
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means to limit police search authority even in the absence of police
misconduct was acknowledged in J.L. as legitimate to protect the citizen
not only from such misconduct, but also from unscrupulous informants.
Indeed, the primary concern invoked by the Court in that case in relation
to reliance on a non-predictive anonymous tip was not police
misconduct, but the lying informant. 139 Nonetheless, because the Court
has consistently emphasized the link between exclusion of tangible
evidence and deterrence of police misconduct, 140 decoupling deterrence
of police misconduct from a rule of evidentiary exclusion is difficult to
justify.
B.

The Military ExclusionaryApproach

One solution to the over-breadth of the first option is to consider an
alternate approach that links exclusion to an inference of police
misconduct in the form of subterfuge. As noted above, military criminal
practice offers a useful model for this more limited exclusionary
approach. 14 ' Evidence admissibility in courts-martial generally mirrors
that of federal criminal trials. 142 Like all citizens, the Fourth Amendment
safeguards against unreasonable search and seizure protect members of
the armed forces, even when a commander orders the search or seizure.
Unlike the normal search and seizure context, however, what qualifies as
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the military community is
sometimes different than in the civilian community, and the process for
assessing probable cause and authorizing evidentiary searches is also
14
different.

These processes are established by the Military Rules of Evidence
(MREs). In many respects, the MREs are almost identical to the Federal
Rules of Evidence (FREs). However, unlike the FREs, the MREs
include a section establishing search and seizure authority, authorization

139. See JL., 529 U.S. at 270.
140. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009) ("The extent to

which the exclusionary rule is justified by . . . deterrence principles varies with the
culpability of the law enforcement conduct."); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 91213 (1984) ("The propriety of retroactive application of a newly announced Fourth
Amendment principle, moreover, has been assessed largely in terms of the contribution
retroactivity might make to the deterrence of police misconduct.") (citations omitted).
141. See supranote 135 and accompanying text.
142. Compare MIL. R. EVID. 401-03, with FED. R. EVID. 401-03.
143.

See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976) ("The standard of

probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal
procedures. The probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon the
reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions, particularly when no claim
is made that the protective procedures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations.")
(citations omitted).
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process, and evidentiary admissibility rules. 144 Just as in the civilian
context, any intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy for the
purpose of investigating suspicion of crime and gathering evidence must
be based on probable cause. 145 Authorization is also normally required,
and may be granted by a commander, a military magistrate, or a federal
judge. 146 All established exceptions to the warrant and probable cause
requirement that apply in the civilian context also apply in the military
context.
Perhaps the most unique aspect of military search and seizure law is
MRE 313, which addresses the admissibility of evidence seized during
the course of an inspection. According to MRE 313(b):
An "inspection" is an examination of the whole or part of a unit,
organization, installation, vessel, aircraft, or vehicle, including an
examination conducted at entrance and exit points, conducted as an

incident of command the primary purpose of which is to determine
and to ensure the security, military fitness, or good order and
discipline of the unit, organization, installation, vessel, aircraft, or
vehicle. 147

inspection
MRE 313(a) provides that any evidence obtained during an
48
trial.1
at
admissible
is
rule
the
with
conducted in accordance
Inspections are unsurprisingly a ubiquitous aspect of military life.
Commanders use inspections constantly to ensure the health, welfare,
and fitness for duty of their units.149 Inspections range from assessing
the cleanliness of a soldier's quarters to conducting a urinalysis to ensure
that soldiers are not using illegal narcotics and are therefore fit for duty.
However, it is equally obvious that the broad authority for lawful use of
inspections is an invitation for using inspections as a subterfuge to
discover evidence of a crime when the normal search and seizure
For example, assume a unit
requirements cannot be satisfied.
commander hears a rumor that a soldier in her unit is selling drugs to
other soldiers out of his barracks room. The commander, vested with
statutory authority to grant a search authorization based on probable
cause, could conduct an investigation in an attempt to establish the
requisite probable cause to order a search of the suspect's room.
However, what if the commander realizes that she will be unable to meet
that cause requirement? Because she is also vested with the authority to

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See MIL. R. EviD. 311.
See id. 313(c)(3), 315.
See id. 315(d).
Id. 313(b).
See id. 313(a).

149.

See MIL. R. EviD. 313(b)(1).
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order a health and welfare inspection of the barracks, she might very well
do so in hopes of uncovering contraband in the suspected soldier's
barracks room. If that evidence is discovered, should it be admissible at
trial?
MRE 313(b)(2) contemplates this risk of subterfuge, and provides:
"An examination made for the primary purpose of obtaining evidence for
use in a trial by court-martial or in other disciplinary proceedings is not
an inspection within the meaning of this rule."' 150 Accordingly, the
evidence will not be admissible as the fruits of an inspection. But what if
the commander simply asserts that her primary purpose was legitimate
and not to discover evidence for use at trial? MRE 313(b)(3)(B) also
addresses this risk, and provides:
The prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the examination was an inspection within the meaning of this rule if a
purpose of an examination is to locate weapons or contraband, and if:
(i) the examination was directed immediately following a report of a
specific offense in the unit, organization, installation, vessel, aircraft,
or vehicle and was not previously scheduled; (ii) specific individuals
are selected for examination; or (iii) persons examined are subjected
to substantially different intrusions during the same examination. 151
This rule of evidence provides an effective means by which a defendant
may raise the inference of invalid use of inspection authority. If
evidence indicates the inspection was ordered in response to suspicion of
criminal activity, or that the manner of inspection execution suggests
there was a specific target, a presumption of inadmissibility is triggered,
requiring the government to rebut the presumption by clear and
convincing evidence.
Applied to the terrorist tip scenario analyzed in this Article, a rule
analogous to MRE 313(b) would trigger a presumption of inadmissibility
for all evidence found in an expanded Terry protective search, unless the
prosecution could show clear and convincing evidence that the search
was based on reasonable suspicion as understood in the expanded sense
discussed above. A look at the difference between the civilian criminal
context and the military paradigm, however, highlights several
disconnects that could impact the effectiveness of the rule directly
applied. In the military inspection context, the combined effect of the
small and closely connected relationship between commanders and
members of their units, and the professional ethos of integrity, facilitates
defense efforts to identify subterfuge. First, it is often common for other
members of the defendant's unit to be aware that the command had
150. Id.313(b)(2).
151. Id. 313(b)(3)(B).
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focused a generalized suspicion on the defendant. News travels fast in a
military unit, and when the commander decides that a subordinate is
probably involved in misconduct-in the subterfuge inspection context,
this will frequently be a suspicion that the subordinate is using illegal
narcotics-the "he's a dirtbag" message is often transmitted to other
members of the unit either explicitly or implicitly. Thus, when the
defense counsel searches for evidence of subterfuge, it often comes from
other subordinates who share their own interactions with the commander
or other members of the leadership team. Identifying subterfuge is also
facilitated by the military professional ethos of integrity. Commanders
confronted with direct questions regarding when and why they suspected
a subordinate, and why they ordered an inspection, will normally respond
with candor. Of course, this is not always the case. However, the culture
of integrity within the military will inevitably impact the efficacy of
defense efforts to identify subterfuge.
The first of these factors is simply inapposite to the anonymous car
bomb tip context. Unlike the soldier targeted for an invalid inspection, it
will be almost impossible for the subject of a subterfuge police search to
find others who will attest to the ulterior police motives. Nor is the
discovery process likely to enhance the probability of finding such
witnesses. If subterfuge is in fact the motive for a vehicle search, it is
counterintuitive that police would document such an illicit motive. The
second factor-a cultural ethos of integrity and candor on the part of
those responsible for the government action-may very well be equally
significant in this context. It is likely, however, that members of the
civilian defense bar would be skeptical that police officers engaged in
such searches would candidly admit a subterfuge motive, especially
when the search uncovers highly incriminating evidence and they will
understand that the consequence of candor is suppression. Or, perhaps in
the military context the first factor (which is inapplicable in the police
search context) influences the ultimate candor of the commander
In other words, the
confronted with the subterfuge allegation.
commander will be much more reticent about denying subterfuge if she
suspects that other subordinates may have already alerted the defense
counsel to prior statements or conduct that suggest just such a motive.
Extracting the influence of this factor from the equation in the civilian
police context must inevitably undermine potential efforts of a defense
counsel to expose a subterfuge motive.
Adopting a similar approach as a limitation on the use of evidence
seized during a car bomb protective search would protect individuals
from the consequence of subterfuge by the police. Perhaps more
importantly, it would link exclusion to an inference of police misconduct,
thereby aligning the limitation with the existing police deterrence
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rationale police for the exclusionary rule. However, only the first of the
three adverse inference triggers in MRE 313(b) would logically extend to
the protective search context. Because such searches would be based on
individualized suspicion, there would be no way to assess legitimacy by
comparison to other search targets, as in the case of an inspection. The
result of these differences is that some alternate approach for triggering
the subterfuge presumption is necessary.
The most logical solution for a limitation based on MRE 313 would
be a more hybrid approach: trigger a presumption of inadmissibility for
any evidence unrelated to the alleged terrorist activity, rather than for all
evidence. This is a clear and objective indication that the search may
have been conducted after police already suspected the defendant for an
unrelated offense. This subterfuge inference would not trigger an
absolute exclusionary rule, but would instead require exclusion unless
the prosecution can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
search was a genuine response to an imminent threat of a bomb attack,
and not a subterfuge.
This approach is certainly less protective against subterfuge or the
lying informant than an absolute exclusion of any evidence unrelated to
the alleged terrorist threat triggering the search-the first limitation
option above. It also relieves the defendant of the initial burden to raise
the inference of subterfuge.
This certainly runs counter to normal
suppression practice that requires defendants to provide some evidence
of police misconduct in order to trigger exclusion of evidence. The fact
that it is often difficult to discover such evidence has never been
considered a justification for altering the basic principle that exclusion
requires evidence of some unlawful police conduct. However, as noted
above, in this very unique context, imposing such a burden on the
defendant may functionally nullify any effort to limit the use of alleged
terrorism tips as a subterfuge to conduct an otherwise unreasonable
search or seizure.
This balance between an absolute exclusionary rule and the existing
plain view doctrine strikes a fair balance between protecting individuals
from subterfuge search, and permitting the government to introduce
evidence-whether related to terrorism or not-seized as the result of a
truly reasonable search.
Is it possible that this will permit the
government to admit evidence seized during a protective search that was
in fact used as a subterfuge? The answer is yes, but this is no different
than any other evidentiary suppression issue. Ultimately, the efficacy of
even this rule to protect citizens from an unjustified invocation of an
expanded Terry response authority to car bomb threats will be, as in any
other invocation of an exclusionary rule, contingent on the adversarial
process to establish the requirements for exclusion. Ideally, the risk of
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such exposure itself will deter police from engaging in subterfuge
searches, a risk that will increase each time police assert the justification
and engage in searches that lead to the seizure of unrelated contraband.
V.

CONCLUSION

"First responder" is a term that will increasingly define the U.S.
counter-terrorism effort. Indeed, much criticism has been leveled at the
government for its decision to rely on military power as a first response
to the threat of terrorism. Nowhere is that criticism more intense than
within the domestic realm. Accordingly, local law enforcement has and
will continue to be viewed as the first line of defense against the threat of
terrorism. The tactics associated with that threat continue to evolve from
those associated with highly organized transnational terrorist groups like
al-Qaeda seeking to conduct large-scale attacks, to those of the lone-wolf
self-radicalized operative. As a result, the demands placed on local law
enforcement to respond to alleged terrorist plots continue to increase.
Added to this equation is the reality that improvised explosive devices
will likely continue to be the weapon of choice for any terrorist seeking
to inflict large numbers of casualties with minimal effort, sophistication,
and cost. Easily assembled and employed, and difficult to detect, the use
of such devices has come to define contemporary terrorist tactics.
Whether in the form of a suicide bomber or a stationary weaponized
object such as a car bomb, terrorist use of improvised explosive devices
presents a genuine threat to public safety.
Uncovering plots to employ car bombs will therefore be a major
focus of law enforcement counter-terrorism efforts. To date, these
efforts have been remarkably successful. This has been in large measure
the result of law enforcement infiltration of terrorist networks and/or
terrorist chat groups, enabling effective investigations early in the
bomber's planning cycle.
As the nature of this threat becomes
increasingly individual and less organized in nature, the efficacy of this
investigative approach will necessarily decline. Instead of infiltration
tactics, effective detection and prevention of such attacks will likely
become increasingly dependent on informant tips.
Ideally, such tips will trigger investigative efforts that produce
independent probable cause to justify searches and seizures of terrorist
related contraband in time to avert a catastrophic attack. Even the police
response to the terrorist attempt to detonate an IED in Times Square
demonstrates that in the right circumstances, an anonymous tip can
trigger an investigation that produces probable cause and rapid police
response that protects the public. However, in that case, police were
genuinely fortunate that the information that produced probable cause
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was readily observable from outside the vehicle that had been
weaponized. What is the reasonable response if the tip does not lead to
such an observation?
Application of existing Fourth Amendment standards of
reasonableness results in an unsatisfactory answer: police must continue
to investigate a tip of an imminent terrorist bomb attack until they
establish some objective indicia of reliability. Even then, existing Fourth
Amendment standards would permit a protective search of an individual
suspected of carrying a suicide bomb, but not necessarily the interior
search of an automobile suspected of having been weaponized. Both the
limitation on the initial response and on the scope of a responsive search
seem unreasonable in this context. Instead, whether responding to a tip
of a suicide bomber or a car bomb, the reasonable response seems clear:
seize the individual or vehicle and conduct a narrowly tailored protective
search to confirm or deny the threat. Any other response will subject the
public to a grave danger, and if police hesitate to respond to the tip with
the result of widespread casualties, that hesitation will almost certainly
be condemned as unreasonable.
Permitting a protective search in response to an anonymous nonpredictive tip of imminent terrorist attack therefore seems consistent with
the underlying rationale of the Terry doctrine. A unanimous Supreme
Court suggested as much in Floridav. J.L. However, because extending
the Terry protective seizure and search to this context decouples police
action from any meaningful objective indicia of reliability, a terrorist
threat exception to the normal test for reasonable suspicion creates a
genuine risk of subterfuge. The response to this risk is not rejection of
the terrorist threat exception; it is to adopt a limited-use doctrine for
evidence seized as the result of invoking the exception.
Establishing either a conclusive or presumptive rule of
inadmissibility for evidence seized as the result of a protective search
that is unrelated to the threat that triggered the search will ensure an
appropriate balance between public safety and individual liberty. A true
limited-use rule-one that limits evidence available for use at trial only
to that related to the threat that triggered the search-will have the
greatest deterrent effect on potential police subterfuge. Perhaps more
importantly, it will protect the target of the search from ulterior motives
of the informant, even where police act in good faith. Such an approach
may be inconsistent with the traditional requirement that exclusion be
linked to police misconduct. However, it is responsive to the concerns
raised by the Court in Florida v. J.L. that endorsing a threat-specific
reduction in the objective component of reasonable suspicion will subject
individuals to harassment by other members of the community, namely
the prevaricating informant.
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The alternative would be to adopt a rule similar to Military Rule of
Evidence 313(b), which protects service-members from the risk of
command use of inspection authority as a subterfuge to avoid compliance
with the normal individualized suspicion requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. This rule would be triggered by offering as evidence
against a defendant contraband seized during the course of a protective
search unrelated to the threat that led to the search. Because of the lack
of relation between the alleged justification for the search and the
evidence, a presumption of inadmissibility would apply to such evidence.
At that point, admissibility would be permitted only when the
prosecution is able to rebut the presumption of subterfuge with clear and
convincing evidence that the search was a legitimate invocation of the
Terry protective doctrine.
Ultimately, waiting for the next major terrorist attack to occur is not
the ideal time to address this twilight zone that lies between existing
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the evolving nature of the terrorist
threat to society, and law enforcement investigative techniques. Instead,
both Congress and state legislatures should consider endorsing this
terrorism threat protective search approach by statute, thereby triggering
the inevitable judicial scrutiny that will ensue. The alternative is to
subject police to a dilemma between public safety and subsequent
evidence admissibility, a dilemma that in the context of a terrorist tip will
almost certainly be resolved in favor of safety. Police should be
confident that in such situations their conduct is not only pragmatically
reasonable, but also legally reasonable.

